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This paper addresses two side effects of corporate lobbying on firm value in the pharmaceutical 
industry. Employing corporate lobbying and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval 
data for the period from 1998 to 2013, we find that lobbying firms have a 67.3 percent higher 
chance that their new prescription drugs are approved by the FDA than non-lobbying firms. On 
the 3-day window surrounding FDA approval announcements, lobbying firms yield, on average, 
a 1.1% higher market reaction than non-lobbying peers. However, we also find that insiders in 
lobbying firms abnormally purchase their own stocks prior to FDA approvals. These 
opportunistic purchases substantially increase a firm’s litigation risk. Our evidence highlights the 
ambivalence of lobbying. While lobbying enhances firm value, it also offers an opportunity for 
insiders to trade their shares first by exploiting private information that eventually hurts firm 
value.  
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Two Faces of Corporate Lobbying: Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry 
 
1. Introduction 
Corporate political investment appears in various forms: through electing former politicians 
to a corporate board, donating to Political Action Committees (PACs), and/or lobbying. 
Corporate political activities are not always equally effective and therefore, are not equally 
employed. For instance, Milyo, Primo and Groseclose (2000) find that lobbying expenditures at 
the U.S. federal level are five times that of PAC campaign contributions. Along with a growing 
role of corporate lobbying, there are on-going debates as to whether corporate lobbying creates 
or hurts value for the shareholders. However, existing empirical evidence is largely inconclusive 
on the issue (e.g., positive relation (Chen, Parsley and Yang (2015), Chen, et al. (2015), Hill, Kelly, 
Lockhart and Ness (2013), Kim (2008), Shaffer, Quasney and Grimm (2000)); negative relation 
(Yu and Yu (2012), Coates (2011), Igan, Mishra and Tressel (2011); neutral relation (Hersch, 
Netter and Pope (2008), Lenway, Jacobson and Goldstein (1990)). 
In this article, we investigate how corporate lobbying influences firm value in the 
pharmaceutical industry. Pharmaceutical companies spend a vast amount of research and 
development (R&D) funds to develop new drugs every year. The best way to cash out their 
investment is winning an approval from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to 
commercialize their newly-developed drugs. However, winning FDA approval is rigorous, 
expensive, time consuming, and sometimes take more than ten years to complete1. According to 
Hay, Thomas, Craighead, Economides and Rosenthal (2014), the overall success rate from Phase 
I to FDA approval is nearly 9 percent. The approval rate would be even lower (less than 0.1 
percent) if it included “Pre-Clinical Phase,” a stage during which researchers look for potential 
                                       
1 The phases in the FDA approval process consist of pre-clinical Phase, Phase I, Phase II, Phase III, 
New Drug Application (NDA)/Biologics License Application (BLA), and Phase IV in order. Each phase 
take, on average, three and a half years, one year, two years, three years, one/two years, respectively. 
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new compounds to target selected diseases. The 2015 industry profile 2  released by 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufactures of America (PhRMA) reports that the average R&D 
expenditure of PhRMA members3 is $51.2 billion and domestic R&D (total R&D) as a 
percentage of domestic sales (total sales) is 23.4 percent (17.9 percent) in 2014. Therefore, for 
pharmaceutical companies, winning FDA approval is picking the ‘money fruits’ after the years of 
their efforts to develop new drugs. In this respect, pharmaceutical companies would give up a 
great deal to get the FDA approval. One of the popular and effective tools for gaining FDA 
approval is lobbying4. The Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) data show pharmaceutical firms 
spend more than $1.6 billion lobbying the Congress and the Obama administration for the 7-year 
span from 2009 to 2015.   
Using corporate lobbying expenses and FDA approvals data, we address the following 
questions: (1) Does corporate lobbying improve/deteriorate firm value? (2) Through which 
channel does corporate lobbying affect firm value? We select the top 200 pharmaceutical 
companies based on annual market capitalization at the end of each year for the period from 
1998 to 2013. We limit our empirical analyses to large pharmaceutical companies because they 
are able to lobby and are incentivized to lobby in order to realize high expected returns on their 
substantial R&D expenditures. 
We first explore the likelihood a firm wins FDA approval with or without lobbying.  Based 
on our sample, in 2010, about 43 percent5 of pharmaceutical firms are actively engaging in 
lobbying by spending over 177 million dollars aiming at influence on over 1,400 bills in favor of 
their products. Given the nature of motivation for lobbying, it is plausible to expect that active 
lobbying positively influences outcome of the FDA approval. Consistent with our hypothesis, we 
find that lobbying firms have a 67.3 percent higher chance of getting FDA approvals than non-




5 For corresponding year, about 12% of firms listed in Compustat engage in lobbying.  
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lobbying pharmaceutical firms. In addition, stock market reactions are more positive for 
lobbying firms on the FDA drug approval announcement than those for non-lobbying firms. On 
average, over the three-day event period (-1 to +1 day) surrounding the announcement dates, the 
cumulative abnormal returns are 110 basis points greater for lobbying firms than non-lobbying 
firms. The difference is statistically significant at the one percent level. Our finding strongly 
supports the political capital view that corporate political strategies such as lobbying enhance 
firm value (e.g., Faccio (2006)).  
Recent political finance literature demonstrates that corporate political strategies do not 
always add value to firm. For instance, Bebchuk and Jackson (2010) find a decision on corporate 
political spending is made by a few insiders that may deviate from the interests of majority 
shareholders. Motivated by prior studies, we examine whether insiders exhibit rent-seeking 
behavior exploiting private information obtained from lobbying activities associated with FDA 
approvals. We find that lobbying firms are significantly associated with insider trading upon the 
FDA approval announcements. During the two weeks prior to FDA approval, insiders in 
lobbying firms abnormally buy shares of their own companies compared to those in non-
lobbying firms. This opportunistic purchasing substantially increases a firm’s litigation risk which 
eventually hurts firm value. In addition to negative market reaction upon litigation filings, 
lobbying firms pay on average $866,337 to settle SEC allegations. Our finding strongly suggests 
that lobbying exacerbates agency problems.  
Our paper contributes to growing literature that shows how lobbying affects firm value. 
While a number of studies show that U.S. public firms actively make use of lobbying, outcomes 
of political actions are empirically mixed. For instance, Hill, et al. (2013), Chen, et al. (2015), and 
Antia, Kim and Pantzalis (2013) find evidence that corporate lobbying increases firm value. On 
the contrary, Borisov, Goldman and Gupta (2015) show that firms which had employed Jack 
Abramoff, one of top American lobbyists, experienced great loss in firm value after his guilty 
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conviction. Pharmaceutical industry lobbying draws attention from citizens, academia, and 
politics because lobbying firms often influence legislative activities to deliver results in favor of 
their product at the expense of customers. By looking at one of the most politically active 
industries, we find corporate lobbying is not always beneficial to shareholders and could cause a 
new dimension of agency problems.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides related literature and 
develops hypotheses, Section 3 describes data for the analysis, Section 4 reports results, and 
Section 5 concludes the paper.  
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
2.1. Corporate lobbying literature 
Two strands of literature are closely related to our research. One strand of literature focuses 
on determinants of corporate political engagement. Many papers in this strand report key factors 
influencing the likelihood that firms engage in corporate political activity. The factors which 
influence on lobbying activities include industry government regulation (Pittman (1977)); within-
industry concentration(Masters and Keim (1985), Hill, et al. (2013)); size of firm(Salamon and 
Siegfried (1977), Ansolabehere, Snyder and Tripathi (2002); Hill, et al. (2013)); cash flow and 
investment opportunities(Hill, et al. (2013))]. Bonardi, Hillman and Keim (2005) also argue that 
the decision to become politically active depends on how attractive the political market is. In 
sum, firms will be more apt to engage in political activity when participating in the political 
market increases the likelihood of achieving their goal that maximizes shareholders’ wealth. 
According to The Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), the pharmaceuticals/health 
products industry is consistently a top industry in terms of lobbying expenditures per year 
($179.05 million in 2015). Also it reports that pharmaceutical industry lobbying firm conduct 
lobby activities to ensure a quicker approval process for drugs and products entering the market, 
and rely less on randomized controlled trials when deciding whether or not to put a new drug on 
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the market. When lobbying is successful, lobbyists will be able to put more new drugs on 
pharmacy shelves at a faster pace.  
The other strand of literature explores the effect of corporate political investment on 
financial outcomes. Many empirical studies in this line of literature have been attempting to 
answer to the question - Does Corporate Political Activity help firms to achieve their financial 
objectives. Many studies conclude that connected firms receive specific benefits from political 
connection. Specifically the value of political connections lead to better access to finance 
(Claessens, Feijen and Laeven (2008); Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006)), and/or lower 
taxation(Richter, Samphantharak and Timmons (2009)), government bailouts (Faccio, Masulis 
and McConnell (2006)), and  higher market returns (Faccio (2006); Goldman, Rocholl and So 
(2009), Fisman (2001), Jayachandran (2006), Fan, Wong and Zhang (2007), Aggarwal, Meschke 
and Wang (2012)).  
However, the evidence to support the statement that corporate lobbying improves the 
corporate financial bottom line is inconclusive (e.g., positive relation (Chen, et al. (2015), Chen, et 
al. (2015), Hill, et al. (2013), Kim (2008), Shaffer, et al. (2000)); negative relation(Yu and Yu (2012), 
Coates (2011), Igan, et al. (2011); neutral relation (Hersch, et al. (2008), Lenway, et al. (1990)).  
2.2. Insider trading literature 
The legal rules of the U.S. place significant limits on the freedom of corporate insiders to 
engage in trading in securities of organizations in which they are insiders .A large body of 
literature reports that insider trading allows insiders to profitably exploit their private 
information and realize significant trading profits. Because insiders’ motive for trading is often 
neither observable nor verifiable, they often can openly make abnormally profitable trades (Jaffe 
(1974)).  
Damodaran and Liu (1993) argue that there is substantial evidence that insider trading is 
present around corporate announcements and that this insider trading is motivated by private 
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information. Agrawal and Nasser (2012) documents the existence of abnormal insider trading by 
executives prior to takeover announcements and Arshadi and Eyssell (1991) documents and 
there is an association between pre-announcement run-ups and informed trading. Manne (1966) 
and Denis and Xu (2013) argue that insider trading represents a form of compensation for 
managers.  
de Figueiredo and Richter (2014) define “lobbying” as the transfer of information in private 
meetings and venues between interest groups and politicians, their staffs, and agents. Corporate 
political investment in lobbying offers advantage to pharmaceutical firms such as gaining the 
confidence that it will more likely receive favorable decision. Seyhun (1986) argues that insiders 
who are expected to be more knowledgeable are more successful predictors of future abnormal 
stock price changes. Bebchuk and Fershtman (1991) identified that the presence of insider 
trading may cause agency costs under certain conditions.  
  
2.3. Hypotheses 
Our main focus is to examine whether lobbying firms utilize the information of FDA drug 
approval announcement and engage in insider trading activity prior to information leakage. At 
the same time, we acknowledge the potential for lawsuits for the firms with insider trading 
activity. To estimate our parameters, lobbying indicators (including lobbying expenditure, 
number of bills lobbied, and number of issues lobbied) are considered the main explanatory 
variables. Further, we also include a set of firm level control variables to measure the relationship 
between: a) FDA drug approval and lobbying; and b) insider trading and likelihood of lawsuit. 
For this purpose, we hypothesize that; 
H.1: All other things equal, lobbying influences FDA drug approval outcome (𝛽1>0) 
• FDA Approval = 𝛽0+ 𝛽1LobbyingIndicators +∑ 𝛽𝑠 Controls      (1) 
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FDA Approval is the dependent variable and equal to one if a firm receives confirmation from 
FDA, within one year after submitting their drug approval application. For lobbying indicators, 
we run three separate logistic regressions introducing: log transformation of lobbying 
expenditure, log transformation of number of total bill lobbied and an indicator variable equal to 
one if firm has a lobbying activity. Controls are firm-level variables such as R&D, Firm Size, 
ROA, Tobin’s Q, Book Leverage and Tangibility. Our hypotheses also examine whether lobby-
active firms are more likely to get drug approval by spending their resources on political 
connections. Hence, we expect lobbying firms to receive greater market reaction compare to 
non-lobbying firms once the confirmation is announced by FDA. For this reason; we conduct an 
event study to measure the effect of announcement; 
H.2: FDA drug approval announcement event is positively associated with changes in the 
market value of the firm in terms of cumulative abnormal stock returns; 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑀,𝑡        (2) 
Where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the actual return and 𝑅𝑀,𝑡 is the return of a selected market index (we employ 
Value Weight index from CRSP).  
We measure the aggregated abnormal returns that are used in the study and define them as 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns; 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡1,𝑡2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
    (3) 
For the significance of the returns around announcement dates, our null hypothesis is cumulative 
abnormal return of lobbying firms and non-lobbying firms are equal to zero; 
     𝐻𝑜: 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝐿𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑦 = 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑛𝑜𝑛𝐿𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑦 = 0      (4)   
We calculate stock returns of FDA approved firms surrounding announcement dates (with 
various event windows) and reject the null hypothesis by estimating that lobbying firms receive 
greater return compared to non-lobbying firms, and the difference is statistically significant.  
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For the robustness check, we regress CAR on lobbying indicators while controlling for firm-level 
variables to determine how much lobbying firms receive higher return compared to non-
lobbying firms by; 
H.3: All other things equal, lobbying firms receives higher CAR during FDA drug approval 
announcement (𝛽1>0) 
• CAR = 𝛽0+ 𝛽1LobbyingIndicators +∑ 𝛽𝑠 Controls      (5) 
We introduce cross-sectional regression analysis to understand the relationship between CAR 
and lobbying activity. Our goal is demonstrating how much lobbying firms differ in terms of 
receiving positive abnormal return following FDA announcement compared to their non-
lobbying competitors.  
Following that, we are also motivated to investigate the insider trading activity before the FDA 
drug approval if the lobbying firm are more likely to get drug confirmation after engaging 
political activity; 
H.4: All other things equal, lobbying engagement prior to FDA announcement increases the 
insider trading of responsible firms (𝛽1>0) 
• Log(NumInsiderTradingActivity) = 𝛽0+ 𝛽1LobbyingIndicators +∑ 𝛽𝑠 Controls      (6) 
Log(NumInsiderTradingActivity) is the dependent variable and refers to the number of transaction 
by corporate insiders (i.e. CEO and board) at different time intervals. We analyze different time 
intervals as a) number of transactions one month before FDA approval, b) number of 
transaction two weeks before FDA approval, c) number of transaction one week before FDA 
approval. Lobbying indicators are the same firm-level lobbying involvement and controls are 
firm specific control variables. The detailed definitions of variables are described in Appendix.  
In addition to our first four hypotheses, we investigate the relation between insider trading and 
SEC lawsuit filings. Since insider trading is considered illegal by SEC, actions could be taken 
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after shareholders’ complaints.6 Therefore, we hypothesize that insider trading activity before 
FDA approval increases the likelihood of SEC lawsuit filings against corporations who violates 
shareholder rights. 
H.5: All other things equal, insider trading prior to FDA announcement increases the likelihood 
of SEC lawsuit. (𝛽1>0) 
• SECLawsuit= 𝛽0+ 𝛽1 Log(NumInsiderTradingActivity)  +∑ 𝛽𝑠 Controls      (7) 
Dependent variable SEC lawsuit is equal to one if firm is facing lawsuit one year after insider 
trading activity prior to FDA drug approval announcement. Our main explanatory variable 
Log(NumInsiderTradingActivity) is the number of insider transaction one month, two weeks or 
one week  before the FDA confirmation. The sign and the magnitude of 𝛽1 refer to the 
increased likelihood of SEC lawsuit for firms if they have insider trading activity. Controls are 
firm specific control variables. The detailed definitions of variables are described in Appendix. 
3. Data 
3.1.  Firm Data 
We use the COMPUSTAT database to identify pharmaceutical firms based on SIC code and 
Fama French 12 Industry Classification: Industry 10 (Health, Healthcare, Medical Equipment 
and Drugs). We sort firms by size (market cap) and select top 200 large firms in every year. Our 
sample begins in 1998 and ends in 2013. The sample includes 582 unique firms. Our sample has 
211 unique firms which engage lobbying activity during sample period of 1998 and 2013 in 
which for a total of 3200 firm-year observation. To calculate firm-specific control variables, we 
use COMPUSTAT and Center for Research Security Prices.  
3.2. FDA Drug Approval Data 




We collect FDA drug approval cases from official FDA Agency documentation7 and match the 
drug approved firms with ExecuComp to identify the firms in our sample. For our sample 
period, we identify 80 unique firms that have at least one drug approved by FDA. Moreover, we 
use FDA database to calculate the total number of drug approval for firms yearly. In addition, 
we also collect confirmation announcements from approval cases to conduct the event study for 
responsible firms.  
3.3. Insider Trading Data 
We gather insider trading data from Thomson Reuters Insider Fillings which contains 
transaction activity of insiders at personal level. Under insiders’ data, we use Stock Transaction 
database to calculate the number of transactions before FDA drug approval of responsible firms. 
For our sample span, we have 442 unique insiders8 in 30 distinct firms.  
3.4. Lobbying Information 
Lobbying information is collected from Center for Responsible Politics (CRP)9. The database 
contains U.S firms which engage in lobbying in calendar year. We match ExecuComp with CRP 
database to identify the publicly traded firms which are registered as lobbyist between 1998 and 
2013. Moreover, CRP database includes additional information such as number of bills lobbied, 
number of issues lobbied, total amount spent on lobbying and the lobbying agency (i.e. U.S 
House or U.S Senate). We also use Congressional Bill database10 to identify lobbied bill which 
are passed in both Senate and House of Representatives.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 1 shows the lobbying characteristics for the firms in our sample over the period of 1998 
and 2013. #LOBFirms represents the total number of firms which engage lobbying activity (i.e. 
                                       
7 http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/InformationOnDrugs/ 
8 Insiders are classified as; Directors, Committees, Officers, Affiliates, Beneficial Owners and Others.  
9 www.opensecrets.org/lobbying   
10 http://www.congressionalbills.org/   
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spending lobbying expenditure and lobbying at least one bill) in a given year.  We also report 
the percentage of lobbyist firm in the sample, as well as total number of bills lobbied and total 
lobbying amount spend by responsible firms for given years. We observe the proportion of firms 
who engage in lobbying rapidly increases after early 2000s, as well as total number of bills 
lobbied and total lobbying expenditure. By 2013, we document that 42% of firms in our sample 
are lobbyists and they lobbied 1193 bills while spending approximately $154 million on average. 
These observations are consistent with the findings of Milyo, et al. (2000) and Chen, et al. (2015), 
in that the amount of lobbying expenditures increases over times and more firms choose 
lobbying as a tool to achieve their goals. 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for lobbying activities, FDA approvals, and other control 
variables. As shown in Table 2, an average pharmaceutical firm spends $570,000 on lobbying 
each year during our sample period. Also Table 2 display that 35 percent of firms in the 
pharmaceutical industry lobbied in a given year and the average number of bills that firms 
lobbied in a year is 4.24.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 3 presents comparison of lobbying activities and firm characteristics based on their FDA 
approval status. 50 percent of firms that lobbied received FDA approval for their drug 
application while only 33 percent of firms that did not lobby get FDA approval. This difference 
is statistically significant (17 percent with t-statistics 6.3). In addition, the firms that get FDA 
approval spend $1.8 million on lobbying but the firms that did not receive FDA approval spends 
only $410,000, on average (difference in lobbying expenditure is $1.39 million with t-statistics 
6.12).  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
3.5. Security Exchange Commission Lawsuit Data 
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To examine the firm level litigation process, we use Stanford Law School Securities Class Action 
Clearinghouse database11. The information in the database contains major characteristics of 
lawsuits which are initiated by SEC actions; the reason for lawsuit (insider trading, large trade 
reporting, false and misleading statement, manipulation), the announcement of litigation date, 
the duration of lawsuit and the outcome (settlement and dismissal). The data also contains total 
settlement amount paid by firms in case of mutual settlement decision. We match Stanford Law 
School Securities Class Action database with ExecuComp in order to measure the relationship 
between insider trading and lawsuit probability. 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Lobbying activity and FDA drug approval 
In this section we test whether lobbying activity increases the likelihood of FDA approvals. 
Table 4 presents the results of our logistic regressions. We regress FDA approval dummy on 
lobby activity variables with other control variables. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The results in Table 4 show that corporate lobbying activities predict FDA drug approval. The 
estimated coefficients on the lagged level of Lobbydum and LobbyAmount are 0.722(p-value=0.32) 
and 0.058(p-value=0.037), respectively.  Given the fact that only 3912 novel drugs classified as 
new molecular entities (NMEs) and biological license applications (BLAs) were approved by the 
FDA in 2012, the findings presented in Table 5 suggests that corporate lobbying activities result 
in higher probabilities of success of drug development.  
4.2. Lobbying activity and stock market response 
                                       
11
 http://securities.stanford.edu/filings.html 
12 The number of new drugs approved by FDA in 2012 is the highest number of approvals since 1997 
and the average number of approval per year over the past decade is 26 (See Hay, et al. (2014)) 
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To see whether lobbying activities add value, we run an event study around announcements of 
FDA drug approvals. If lobbying activities enhance firms’ financial bottom line, the lobbying 
should be associated with a positive cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and should be greater in 
market reaction than the non-lobbying upon FDA approval announcements. We calculate the 
market-adjusted CARs for a variety of event windows around the announcement dates. The 
event date is defined as the announcement date for FDA approving New Drug Application 
(NDA). When an NDA comes in, FDA has 60 days to decide whether to file it so that it can be 
reviewed. If the application is incomplete, FDA can refuse to file the application.   
The results reported in Panel A of Table 5 indicate that stock market responses more favorably 
to the FDA drug approvals for lobbying firms than non-lobbying firms. The differences are 
statistically significant at the one percent level. This initial evidence is tested in a multivariate 
setting.  
To measure a firm’s lobbying effect on stock market reaction to the FDA approval 
announcement, we use a dummy variable for lobbying activities, taking a value of 1 firm lobbied 
at least one bill in a given year and  zero otherwise as well as a continuous lobbying expenditure 
variable for a given year. We regress CARs on the dummy and the continuous variable. As 
shown in Table 3, firm characteristics (e.g., firm size, financial performance, and R&D 
expenditure) of the lobbying and the non-lobbying samples are different, we control for those 
variables with year fixed effect in our regressions.   
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Panel B of Table 5 presents results of multivariate tests for the market-adjusted CAR 
differentials for the three-day (five-day) periods around the FDA drug approval announcement 
dates across lobbying and non-lobbying firms using OLS with robust standard errors clustering 
at the firm-level.  The column (1) and (3) report the results. The coefficients associated with the 
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dummies for lobbying activities are positive and statistically significant. On average, CARs over 
the three-day event period are 102 basis points greater for lobbying firms than non-lobbying 
firms. The result with the dummy variable is confirmed with lobbying expenditure variable. 
Although the coefficients are smaller compared to those of the dummy variable, they are still 
positive and significant and echo the findings in the univariate test.  
4.3. Lobbying activity, insider trading and litigation risk 
Table 6 presents univariate test results for differences in insider trading activities and SEC 
litigations between the lobbying and the non-lobbying firms. de Figueiredo and Richter (2014) 
are defined “lobbying” as the transfer of information in private meetings and venues between 
interest groups and politicians, their staffs, and agents. More importantly through lobbying firms 
collect more information and reduce information asymmetries to make appropriate decision. 
Agrawal and Nasser (2012) documents the existence of abnormal insider trading by executives 
prior to takeover announcements and Arshadi and Eyssell (1991) documents and there is an 
association between pre-announcement run-ups and informed trading. Combined with two lines 
of literature we demonstrate how insiders of lobbying firms in the pharmaceutical industry utilize 
their private information through insider trading and shows that their actions consequently 
increase higher litigation risk. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
The results in Table 6 indicates that higher percent (8 percent higher with t-statistics 2.97) of 
firms that lobbied engages in insider trading activity than the non-lobbying firms. Also it appears 
that the number of insider trading of firms that lobbied is significantly higher than those of firms 
that did not lobby in a week prior to FDA approval. By contrast, we do not find that there is 
difference in insider purchases two-weeks before FDA approval. In addition, the results indicate 
that firms that lobbied have higher numbers of Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) 
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legal enforcement actions due to insider trading. Consequently lobbying firms pay, on average, 
$866,337 more to settle SEC allegations. Our finding on insider trading suggests that with more 
information from lobbying firms that lobbied are more likely engaged in insider trading, resulting 
in SEC legal enforcement action. To more adequately control for factors that could influence the 
likelihood of insider trading, we estimate the effect of lobbying on insider trading in the 
multivariate setting. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
The coefficient estimates in all the columns ((1) to (6)) in Table 7 are positive and statistically 
significant after controlling for firm characteristics. This result confirms the finding in the 
univariate test above, and suggests that top executives of lobbying firms in the pharmaceutical 
industry more likely engage in insider trading based upon the information they collected from 
lobbying activity.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
Lastly we investigate whether insider trading activities of top executives of lobbying firms 
cause higher SEC litigation. In column (1) and (2) of Table 8 we regress the dummy variable for 
SEC litigation against the insider trading variables. Across each column we find evidence of a 
significantly positive relation between insider trading and litigation, suggesting that lobbying 
activities prior FDA approval increases the probability of SEC litigation. To test direct link 
between lobbying actives and SEC litigation, we include interaction terms of insider trading and 
lobbying dummy variables in the model (3) and (4) of Table 8.  We find that the interactions 
terms in the columns are insignificant.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper addresses two-side effects of corporate lobbying activities on firm value by 
examining FDA drug approvals. Using data on corporate lobbying expenses of pharmaceutical 
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firms and FDA approvals between 1998 and 2013, we shed light on the bright and dark sides of 
corporate lobbying on corporate financial performance.  
First, we explore the positive implication of corporate lobbying on firm value. We find that 
firms that lobbied have 67.3 percent higher chance of getting FDA approvals than firms that did 
not lobby after controlling for key determinants for FDA approval such as firm size, R&D 
expenditure and year fixed effect. Given the fact that only 3913 novel drugs classified as new 
molecular entities (NMEs) and biological license applications (BLAs) were approved by the FDA 
in 2012, the finding suggests that corporate political investment in lobbying offer advantage to a 
pharmaceutical firm such as gaining the confidence that it will more likely receive favorable 
decision.  
We also find the stock market responded more favorably to the FDA drug approvals for 
lobbying firms than non-lobbying firms. On average, CARs over the three-day event period (-1 
to +1 day) are 110 basis points greater for lobbying firms than non-lobbying firms. The 
difference is statistically significant at the one percent level. This initial evidence is tested in a 
multivariate setting. Our multivariate estimate points to a robust, positive relationship between 
corporate lobbying and CARs. Combined with earlier results, these findings suggest that not only 
is corporate lobbying related to higher chance of getting FDA approval, but it is also positively 
related to stock market response. 
Lastly we explore the negative implication of corporate lobbying on firm value. We first 
document evidence that a significantly higher percentage of firms that lobbied engage in insider 
trading. During a week prior to FDA approval, insider trading of firms that lobbied is 
significantly higher than those of firms that did not lobby. Specifically, insider purchase of firms 
that lobbied are 15 percent higher than those of firms that did not lobby after controlling for 
                                       
13 The number of new drugs approved by FDA in 2012 is the highest number of approvals since 1997 
and the average number of approval per year over the past decade is 26 (See Hay, et al. (2014)) 
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factors such as firm size, R&D expenditure and year fixed effect. Interestingly firms that lobbied 
faced higher Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) legal enforcement actions due to 
insider trading. Consequently, lobbying firms pay, on average, $866,337 more to settle SEC 
allegations. Our finding on insider trading suggests that with more information from lobbying 






Aggarwal, Rajesh K, Felix Meschke, and Tracy Yue Wang, 2012, Corporate political donations: 
Investment or agency?, Business and Politics 14. 
Agrawal, Anup, and Tareque Nasser, 2012, Insider trading in takeover targets, Journal of Corporate 
Finance 18, 598-625. 
Ansolabehere, Stephen, James M. Snyder, and Micky Tripathi, 2002, Are pac contributions and 
lobbying linked?, Business and Politics 4. 
Antia, Murad, Incheol Kim, and Christos Pantzalis, 2013, Political geography and corporate 
political strategy, Journal of Corporate Finance 22, 361-374. 
Arshadi, Nasser, and Thomas H Eyssell, 1991, Regulatory deterrence and registered insider 
trading: The case of tender offers, Financial Management 30-39. 
Bebchuk, Lucian A, and Chaim Fershtman, 1991, The effect of insider trading on insiders' 
reaction to opportunities to" waste" corporate value,  (National Bureau of Economic 
Research Cambridge, Mass., USA). 
Bebchuk, Lucian A, and Robert J Jackson, 2010, Corporate political speech: Who decides?, 
Harvard Law Review 83-117. 
Bonardi, Jean-Philippe, Amy J Hillman, and Gerald D Keim, 2005, The attractiveness of political 
markets: Implications for firm strategy, Academy of Management Review 30, 397-413. 
Borisov, Alexander, Eitan Goldman, and Nandini Gupta, 2015, The value of (corrupt) lobbying, 
Available at SSRN 2023019. 
Chen, Hui, David Parsley, and Ya‐Wen Yang, 2015, Corporate lobbying and firm performance, 
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 42, 444-481. 
Claessens, Stijn, Erik Feijen, and Luc Laeven, 2008, Political connections and preferential access 
to finance: The role of campaign contributions, Journal of Financial Economics 88, 554-580. 
Coates, John C, 2011, Corporate governance and corporate political activity: What effect will 
citizens united have on shareholder wealth?, SSRN Working Paper Series. 
Damodaran, Aswath, and Crocker H Liu, 1993, Insider trading as a signal of private information, 
Review of Financial Studies 6, 79-119. 
de Figueiredo, John M, and Brian Kelleher Richter, 2014, Advancing the empirical research on 
lobbying, Annual Review of Political Science 17, 163-85. 
Denis, David J, and Jin Xu, 2013, Insider trading restrictions and top executive compensation, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 56, 91-112. 
Faccio, Mara, 2006, Politically connected firms, The American economic review 369-386. 
20 
 
Faccio, Mara, Ronald W Masulis, and John McConnell, 2006, Political connections and corporate 
bailouts, The Journal of Finance 61, 2597-2635. 
Fan, Joseph PH, Tak Jun Wong, and Tianyu Zhang, 2007, Politically connected ceos, corporate 
governance, and post-ipo performance of china's newly partially privatized firms, Journal 
of financial economics 84, 330-357. 
Fisman, Raymond, 2001, Estimating the value of political connections, American Economic Review 
1095-1102. 
Goldman, Eitan, Jörg Rocholl, and Jongil So, 2009, Do politically connected boards affect firm 
value?, Review of Financial Studies 22, 2331-2360. 
Hay, Michael, David W Thomas, John L Craighead, Celia Economides, and Jesse Rosenthal, 
2014, Clinical development success rates for investigational drugs, Nature biotechnology 32, 
40-51. 
Hersch, Philip, Jeffry M Netter, and Christopher Pope, 2008, Do campaign contributions and 
lobbying expenditures by firms create “political” capital?, Atlantic Economic Journal 36, 
395-405. 
Hill, Matthew D, G Wayne Kelly, G Brandon Lockhart, and Robert A Ness, 2013, Determinants 
and effects of corporate lobbying, Financial Management 42, 931-957. 
Igan, Deniz, Prachi Mishra, and Thierry Tressel, 2011, A fistful of dollars: Lobbying and the 
financial crisis,  (National Bureau of Economic Research). 
Jaffe, Jeffrey F, 1974, Special information and insider trading, Journal of business 410-428. 
Jayachandran, Seema, 2006, The jeffords effect*, Journal of Law and Economics 49, 397-425. 
Kim, Jin-Hyuk, 2008, Corporate lobbying revisited, Business and Politics 10. 
Lenway, Stefanie A, Carol K Jacobson, and Judith Goldstein, 1990, To lobby or to petition: The 
political environment of us trade policy, Journal of Management 16, 119-134. 
Leuz, Christian, and Felix Oberholzer-Gee, 2006, Political relationships, global financing, and 
corporate transparency: Evidence from indonesia, Journal of Financial Economics 81, 411-
439. 
Manne, Henry G, 1966. Insider trading and the stock market (Free Press). 
Masters, Marick F, and Gerald D Keim, 1985, Determinants of pac participation among large 
corporations, The Journal of Politics 47, 1158-1173. 
Milyo, Jeffrey, David Primo, and Timothy Groseclose, 2000, Corporate pac campaign 
contributions in perspective, Business and Politics 2, 75-88. 
Pittman, Russell, 1977, Market structure and campaign contributions, Public Choice 31, 37-52. 
Richter, Brian Kelleher, Krislert Samphantharak, and Jeffrey F Timmons, 2009, Lobbying and 
taxes, American Journal of Political Science 53, 893-909. 
21 
 
Salamon, Lester M, and John J Siegfried, 1977, Economic power and political influence: The 
impact of industry structure on public policy, American Political Science Review 71, 1026-
1043. 
Seyhun, H Nejat, 1986, Insiders' profits, costs of trading, and market efficiency, Journal of financial 
Economics 16, 189-212. 
Shaffer, Brian, Thomas J Quasney, and Curtis M Grimm, 2000, Firm level performance 
implications of nonmarket actions, Business & Society 39, 126-143. 
Yu, Frank, and Xiaoyun Yu, 2012, Corporate lobbying and fraud detection, Journal of Financial and 






Time Variation in Corporate Lobbying 
 
Table 1 provides the yearly distribution of our sample that consists of 3,200 firm-year observations for 
200 pharmaceutical firms and 392 unique CEOs between 1998 and 2013. LOBamt is defined as total 
amount spent in lobbying activities in USD. LOBdum is a binary variable and equal to one if firm lobbied 
at least one bill in a given year, zero otherwise. BillSpon is defined as total number of bills lobbied 
including all topics. The lobbying amount is the total amount spent in lobbying activities in a given year 
($ thousands).   
 






1998 200 41 21% 306 45.94 
1999 200 42 21% 384 60.88 
2000 200 52 26% 452 58.15 
2001 200 56 28% 473 60.87 
2002 200 56 28% 490 69.62 
2003 200 74 37% 574 70.83 
2004 200 76 38% 663 91.59 
2005 200 78 39% 773 102.50 
2006 200 83 42% 740 125.70 
2007 200 87 44% 872 157.20 
2008 200 85 43% 1,235 165.70 
2009 200 84 42% 1,462 216.40 
2010 200 86 43% 1,436 177.40 
2011 200 81 41% 1,274 165.50 
2012 200 82 41% 1,289 161.60 















Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of our sample that consists of 3,200 firm-year observations for 200 
pharmaceutical firms and 392 unique CEOs between 1998 and 2013. We use ExecuComp database to 
identify pharmaceutical firms, which are larger in size and located in S&P 1500 plus. LOBamt is defined as 
total amount spent in lobbying activities in USD. LOBdum is a binary variable that equals to one if firm 
lobbied at least one bill in a given year, and zero otherwise. FDAdum is a binary variable that equals to 
one if a firm wins the FDA approval in a given year, and zero otherwise. FDAApprov is the number of 
FDA approval that a firm wins in a given year. BillSpon is defined as total number of bills lobbied 
including all topics. To measure firm-specific control variables, we use COMPUSTAT and CRSP. 
Definitions of variables are in the Appendix. 
 
Variables N Mean Median Std. Min Max 
LOBamt          3,200  0.57  0.00  2.22  0.00  59.90  
LOBdum          3,200  0.35  0.00  0.48  0.00  1.00  
BillSpon          3,200  4.24  0.00  10.65  0.00  150.00  
FDAdum          3,200  0.13  0.00  0.33  0.00  1.00  
FDApprov 3,200 0.48 0.00 1.81 0.00 19.00 
Ln(Assets)          3,200  6.88 6.64 1.71 1.26 12.26 
Tobin's Q          3,200  3.99  0.08  10.12  0.72  522.94  
ROA          3,200  -0.03  0.18  0.41  -16.14  1.25  
Tangible          3,200  0.17  0.04  0.14  0.00  0.99  








Table 3 provides univariate result of our sample that consists of 3,200 firm-year observations for 200 
pharmaceutical firms and 392 unique CEOs between 1998 and 2013. The FDA approved and FDA non-
approved sub-samples consist of 419 and 2,781 firm-year observations, respectively. We report the mean 
differences of lobbying characteristics and firm characteristics between FDA approved and non-approved 
firms. LOBamt is defined as total amount spent in lobbying activities in USD. LOBdum is a binary variable 
and equal to one if firm lobbied at least one bill in a given year, zero otherwise. BillSpon is defined as total 
number of bills lobbied including all topics. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Definitions of variables are in the Appendix. 
 







LOBdum 0.50 0.33 0.17*** [6.30] 
LOBamt 1.80 0.41 1.39*** [6.12] 
Billspon 9.64 3.57 6.07*** [7.16] 
Log(Asset) 8.45 6.64 1.81*** [19.12] 
Tobin's Q 3.28 4.09 -0.81*** [-3.47] 
ROA 0.05 -0.03 0.08*** [8.61] 
Tangible 0.18 0.16 0.01** [2.31] 






Lobbying and FDA Approval 
 
Table 4 reports logistic regression results estimating the relation between FDA drug approvals and 
lobbying activities of our sample over the period of 1998 to 2013. The dependent variable, 
Prob(FDAdum)t+1, is a binary variable taking a value of one if a firm receives approval confirmation from 
FDA in a given year, otherwise zero. LOBamt is defined as total amount spent in lobbying activities in 
USD. LOBdum is a binary variable and equal to one if firm lobbied at least one bill in a given year, zero 
otherwise. BillSpon is defined as total number of bills lobbied including all topics.In parentheses are p-
values.  All models are estimated with year fixed effect.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Definitions of other variables are in the Appendix. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Prob(FDAdum)t+1 Ln(FDApprov)t+1 
LOBdumt 0.722**   0.707**   
 [0.032]   [0.035]   
Ln(LOBamt)t  0.058**   0.056**  
  [0.037]   [0.041]  
Ln(BillSpon)t   0.397   0.387* 
   [0.049]   [0.058] 
Ln(Asset)t 0.546*** 0.544*** 0.551*** 0.555*** 0.553*** 0.560*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Tobin's Qt 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 [0.636] [0.629] [0.639] [0.955] [0.938] [0.938] 
ROAt 1.699*** 1.699*** 1.718*** 1.571** 1.570** 1.588** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.021] [0.022] [0.021] 
Tangiblet -1.021 -1.038 -1.059 -1.000 -1.018 -1.039 
 [0.223] [0.223] [0.217] [0.334] [0.324] [0.313] 
R&Dt 3.179*** 3.165*** 3.223*** 3.016*** 2.998*** 3.059*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Constant -5.777*** -5.762*** -5.106*** -6.250*** -6.233*** -6.276*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
       
Year Fixed  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200 3,200 






FDA Approval Announcement Dates 
 
Table 5 reports market responses to announcements of FDA drug approvals of the lobbying and the 
non-lobbying sub-samples. LOBamt is defined as total amount spent in lobbying activities in USD. 
LOBdum is a binary variable and equal to one if firm lobbied at least one bill in a given year, zero 
otherwise. BillSpon is defined as total number of bills lobbied including all topics. Market adjusted model 
is used to calculated CARs of event windows.  
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑀,𝑡 
Where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the actual return and 𝑅𝑀,𝑡 is the return of a selected market index (CRSP value weight 
index).  Panel B reports regression results estimating the relation between market responses upon FDA 
drug approval announcements and lobbying activities of our sample over the period of 1998 to 2013. The 
dependent variable is cumulative abnormal returns measured by market adjusted model. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Definitions of variables are in the 
Appendix. 
 
Panel A. Event Studies 
 




[-1,+1] 1.30%*** 0.20% 1.10%*** 
 
[7.78] [1.52] [4.54] 
[0,+1] 1.06%*** 0.20%** 0.86% 
 
[7.06] [2.08] [4.07] 
[0,+3] 1.20%*** 0.17% 1.03%*** 
 
[5.61] [0.96] [3.55] 
[-3,+3] 1.51%*** 0.10% 1.41%*** 






Panel B. Multivariate  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  CAR[0,+1] CAR[0,+1] CAR[0,+1]  CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-1,+1]  
LOBdumt 0.010***   0.012***   
 [0.001]   [0.001]   
Ln(LOBamt)t  0.001***   0.001***  
  [0.001]   [0.001]  
Ln(BillSpon)t   0.005***   0.006*** 
   [0.001]   [0.001] 
Ln(Asset)t -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** 
 [0.020] [0.020] [0.018] [0.026] [0.028] [0.028] 
Tobin's Qt 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [0.213] [0.758] [0.735] [0.855] [0.805] [0.805] 
ROAt 0.040* 0.040* 0.041* 0.045* 0.045* 0.044* 
 [0.057] [0.055] [0.049] [0.073] [0.071] [0.069] 
Tangiblet -0.05 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 
 [0.131] [0.608] [0.688] [0.687] [0.408] [0.760] 
R&Dt -0.035 0.018 0.022 0.013 0.013 0.017 
 [0.228] [0.492] [0.413] [0.632] [0.534] [0.543] 
Constant 0.022** 0.024** 0.024** 0.022** 0.023** 0.022** 
 [0.019] [0.017] [0.018] [0.019] [0.023] [0.023] 
Year Fixed  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 1,220 1,220 1,220 1,220 1,220 1,220 





Univariate Analysis: Lobbying, Insider Trading, and Litigation Risk 
 
Table 6 provides univariate analysis of SEC lawsuit characteristics of our sample between 1998 and 2013. 
The lobbying and the non-lobbying sub-samples consist of 478 and 746 lawsuit cases, respectively. 
InsideBuydum_two is a binary variable and equal to one if insider transactions occur two weeks before FDA 
drug approval announcement. InsideBuy_two is defined as total number of insider transaction two weeks 
before FDA drug approval announcement. InsideBuydum_one is a binary variable and equal to one if insider 
transactions occur one week before FDA drug approval announcement. InsideBuy_one two is defined as 
total number of insider transaction one week before FDA drug approval announcement. We report mean 
differences of insider trading and reasons of SEC litigation between the lobbying and the non-lobbying 
sub-samples. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent 













%Firms with Insider Activity 0.33  0.25  0.08** [2.97] 
InsideBuydum_two 0.24 0.21 0.03 [1.57] 
InsideBuy_two 3.50 2.50 0.80 [1.00] 
InsideBuydum_one 0.18 0.14 0.04* [1.82] 
InsideBuy_one 2.30  0.90  1.40*** [3.20] 
N. Ligations 0.04  0.02  0.02** [2.57] 
Reason : Insider Trading 0.04  0.02  0.02** [2.20] 
Reason : Large Trade Reporting 0.02 0.01 0.01 [0.90] 
Reason : False Statement 0.02 0.01 0.01** [1.94] 
Reason : Manipulation 0.01 0.00 0.01*** [2.16] 
Total Settlement Amount 
($ thousands) 






Lobbying Activity and Insider Trading 
 
Table 7 reports logistic regression results estimating the relation between insider trading and lobbying activities of our sample over the period of 1998 to 2013. The dependent 
variables are Ln(InsideBuy_two), log transformation of total number of insider transactions two weeks before FDA drug approval, and  Ln(InsideBuy_one), log transformation of total 
number of insider transactions one week before FDA drug approval. LOBamt is defined as total amount spent in lobbying activities in USD. LOBdum is a binary variable and equal 
to one if firm lobbied at least one bill in a given year, zero otherwise. BillSpon is defined as total number of bills lobbied including all topics. In parentheses are p-values. All models 





Sample Ln(InsideBuy_two) Ln(InsideBuy_one) Ln(InsideBuy_two) Ln(InsideBuy_one) Ln(InsideBuy_two) Ln(InsideBuy_one) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LOBdumt 0.147** 0.104*     
 [0.024] [0.053]     
Ln(LOBamt)t   0.015*** 0.013***   
   [0.001] [0.001]   
Ln(BillSpon)t     0.075*** 0.064*** 
     [0.001] [0.001] 
Ln(Asset)t -0.088*** -0.054*** -0.100*** -0.067*** -0.102*** -0.069*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Tobin's Qt 0.030 0.024 0.029 0.022 0.028 0.021 
 [0.247] [0.285] [0.260] [0.317] [0.275] [0.334] 
ROAt 0.482 0.312 0.481 0.314 0.469 0.304 
 [0.200] [0.334] [0.187] [0.313] [0.204] [0.336] 
Tangiblet -1.280*** -0.911*** -1.331*** -0.955*** -1.326*** -0.950*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
R&Dt 0.939 0.952 0.807 0.850 0.827 0.868 
 [0.195] [0.157] [0.252] [0.195] [0.245] [0.190] 
30 
 
Constant 1.273*** 1.273*** 1.347*** 0.848*** 1.377*** 0.873*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Year Fixed YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 1,220 1,220 1,220 1,220 1,220 1,220 






Insiders’ Purchases and Probability of Being Sued 
 
Table 8 reports logistic regression results estimating the relation between insider trading and lobbying 
activities of our sample over the period of 1998 to 2013. The dependent variables, Prob(Litigdum)tt+1,is a 
binary variable and equal to one if lawsuit filed against the firm one year after insider trading activity prior 
to FDA drug approval, zero otherwise. Ln(InsideBuy_two), log transformation of total number of insider 
transactions two weeks before FDA drug approval, and  Ln(InsideBuy_one), log transformation of total 
number of insider transactions one week before FDA drug approval. LOBdum is a binary variable and 
equal to one if firm lobbied at least one bill in a given year, zero otherwise. In parentheses are p-values. 
All models are estimated with year fixed effect.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. Definitions of other variables are in the Appendix. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Prob(Litigdum)tt+1 Prob(Litigdum)tt+1 Prob(Litigdum)tt+1 Prob(Litigdum)tt+1 
Ln(InsideBuy_two)t 0.466***   0.143   
 [0.001]  [0.790] 
 
Ln(InsideBuy_one)t  0.419**  
0.401 
  [0.046] 
 
[0.272] 
Ln(InsideBuy_two)* LOBdumt    
0.905 
 
   
[0.207] 
 Ln(InsideBuy_one)* LOBdumt    
0.563 
    
[0.307] 





Tobin's Qt -0.678** -0.671** -0.478** -0.471** 
 [0.017] [0.019] [0.027] [0.029] 
ROAt 4.912 4.744 3.91 3.741 
 [0.208] [0.832] [0.200] [0.809] 
Tangiblet 7.098** 6.690** 6.098 6.690** 
 [0.027] [0.037] [0.057] [0.027] 
R&Dt 5.302 5.212 4.343 6.212 
 [0.425] [0.427] [0.415] [0.417] 
Constant -9.974*** -9.316*** -14.574*** -8.516*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Year Fixed YES YES YES YES 
N 1,220 1,220 1,220 1,220 
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The Market Reaction on the FDA Approvals:  








The Market Reaction on Litigations:  































Definitions of Variables 
 
Variables  Definition Source 
Panel A. Lobbying 
 
LOBamt Total amount spent in lobbying activities in USD CRP 
LOBdum 
Binary variable and equal to one if firm lobbied at least one 
bill in a given year, zero otherwise 
CRP 
BillSpon Total number of bills lobbied including all topics CRP 
Panel B. Insider Transaction 
 
InsideBuy_two 
Total number of insider transaction  




Total number of insider transaction  
one week before FDA drug approval announcement 
Thomson 
Reuters  
Panel C. Lawsuit Information 
 
Litigdum 
Binary variable and equal to one if lawsuit filed against the 
firm, zero otherwise. 
Stanford Law 
School 
Reason : Insider 
Trading 
Binary variable and equal to one if the reason of lawsuit is 
insider trading, zero otherwise. 
Stanford Law 
School 
Reason : Large 
Trade Reporting 
Binary variable and equal to one if the reason of lawsuit is 




Reason : False & 
Misleading 
Statement 
Binary variable and equal to one if the reason of lawsuit is 
false/misleading  












Total settlement amount paid by firms to the plaintiff. 
Stanford Law 
School 
Settle % Percentage of settlement as an outcome from SEC lawsuit. 
Stanford Law 
School 
Dismiss % Percentage of dismissal as an outcome from SEC lawsuit. 
Stanford Law 
School 
Total Duration of 
Lawsuit 
Total duration of lawsuit. 
Stanford Law 
School 
Panel D. Control Variables  
 
Assets The book value of a firm's assets[at] COMPUSTAT 
Tobin's Q  
Market value of assets divided by book value of assets  
[(prcc_f*csho + at - ceq)/at)]  
COMPUSTAT 
Book Leverage  
Debt in current liabilities plus long-term debt divided by 
assets [(dlc+dltt)/at]  
COMPUSTAT 
ROA Earnings before interests and taxes divided by assets [ib/at] COMPUSTAT 
Tangibilty Ratio of fixed assets to book assets [ppent/at] COMPUSTAT 
R&D 
Research and development normalized by total asset 
[xrd/at] 
COMPUSTAT 
 
